We use a statistical model of commodity trade to measure the extent of integration between regional commodity markets within Russia. Monthly time-series data on regional commodity prices spanning 1994 through 1999 indicate substantial temporal fluctuations in integration over this period: an initial period of widespread integration gradually gave way to a period of disconnectedness in 1995 through 1997, which seems to have subsided by mid-1998. These temporal fluctuations exhibit strong statistical relationships with a host of aggregate variables; most notably, internal integration exhibits a strong negative relationship with international trade.
Introduction
The economic reforms initiated by Russia in the early 1990s were designed in part to help establish strong internal market linkages across its far-flung and diverse regions. However, recent evidence suggests that the Russian economy more closely resembles a collection of fragmented internal markets, with fiefdoms controlled by regional politicians. For example, roughly 30 percent of Russia's regions erected official trade barriers of various types following the financial collapse in the summer of 1998 (Serova, 1998) . And since the early 1990s, conservative regions such as Bashkortostan and Ulyanovsk are reported to have established border controls and issued ration coupons to residents in order to limit the export of consumer goods to other regions, and to curtail non-residential consumption of low-priced goods (Koen and Phillips, 1993; Mitchneck, 1995; and Freinkman, Treisman and Titov, 1999) .
While examples of regional trade barriers can be found within Russia, the pervasiveness and persistence of such barriers is unclear. Here, we use a statistical model of commodity trade to analyze the extent to which distance and regional borders account for observed differences in commodity prices across 74 regions in Russia. Monthly time-series data on regional commodity prices spanning 1994
through 1999 are used to analyze the extent to which the importance of these explanatory variables evolved over this period. Our results indicate substantial time variation: an initial period of widespread integration -signaled by the relative statistical unimportance of regional borders in accounting for regional price variation -gradually gave way to a period of disconnectedness in 1995 through 1997, which seems to have subsided by May of 1998. Glushchenko (2000) finds a similar temporal pattern of integration using an alternative statistical methodology.
Having described these temporal fluctuations in market integration, we analyze how they relate to temporal fluctuations in inflation volatility, internal transport costs, international trade, public discontent, and standards of living. With the exception of inflation volatility, we find that these variables exhibit strong statistical relationships with integration. Regarding the relationship between integration and international trade, it bears mentioning that the widespread disconnectedness we observe between -3 -1996 and 1997 coincides with a period in which Russia had a strong export performance, and attracted a tremendous amount of international portfolio investment. Conditional on the additional variables we consider the statistical relationship between internal integration and international trade remains strong. Young (1999) has argued in the case of China that their unusually high trade-to-GDP ratio could signal weakening inter-regional trade relations; this observation appears to be true in Russia.
A caveat with this aspect of our analysis is that the variables we consider are measured at the aggregate level. Our goal in future work is to analyze how regional measures of economic performance, public discontent, etc. interact with the aggregate data considered here in influencing integration.
A growing literature has attempted to measure and explain market integration in transition economies. Gardner and Brooks (1994) studied this problem for the first seven months of the Russian reform, a period in which the federal government attempted to rapidly transform the Russian economy from a system with fixed prices and highly administered inter-regional relations, to one in which interregional resource allocations were guided by a flexible price system. Their analysis focused on differences in the level of food prices across cities; for a wide variety of goods, they found large differences in prices that could not be explained by distance. Since arbitrage opportunities for tradable goods do not persist in inter-regional markets within developed countries (e.g., see Engel and Rogers, 1996; Parsley and Wei, 1996; and Rogoff, 1996) , Gardner and Brooks concluded that Russia's market integration was limited. De Masi and Koen (1996) studied Russian price data through 1994. They also found inter-regional price dispersion to be high by international standards, and concluded that market integration was not advanced. On a more positive front, Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) found that the primary source of high inter-regional price dispersion in Russia during the period 1992-1996 was a relatively small group of pro-Communist and anti-market-reform regions. Finally, after analyzing regional production patterns in China, Young (1996 Young ( , 1999 concluded that the Chinese internal market has been poorly integrated since the inception of market reforms in 1978. However, Naughton (1999) used regional trade-flow data to argue that Young overstated China's market integration problem.
The studies cited above analyzed market integration over set time periods. Our goal in studying temporal changes in market integration is to begin to understand causes of these changes for Russia.
Measuring Integration
In integrated market economies, arbitrageurs and traders can quickly move tradable goods from regions in which sales prices are low to regions in which prices are high, so long as transport costs are not prohibitive. This implies that within a group of integrated regional markets, price differentials for similar tradable goods sold in different regions will be increasing in the distance separating the regions.
More formally, let Q ij (t) denote the percentage price differential for some tradable good sold in regions i and j at some date t: Q ij (t) = abs(log(P i (t)/ P j (t))), where throughout the paper log denotes the natural log.
Also, let d ij represent the distance separating regions i and j, where inter-regional transport costs are increasing in d ij . In the absence of border taxes, highway robberies, breakdowns in the transport system, and other barriers to inter-regional trade, arbitrage opportunities exist at some date t when Q ij (t) is greater than or equal to transport costs. However, when Q ij (t) is less than transport costs, moving the good between these two regions is not profitable, and inter-regional trade does not occur.
In order to quantify the relationship between distance and transport costs, we follow Engel and Rogers (1996) in employing Krugman's (1991) transport cost model, in which 1 -1/(1+ d ij ) is the share of a good that depreciates when it is moved between regions i and j. Arbitrageurs can profitably buy goods in region j and resell these goods in region i when P i / (1 + d ij ) ≥ P j ; the same arbitrageurs can profitably buy goods in region i and resell in region j when P j / (1 + d ij ) ≥ P i . So, given an integrated internal market, there will be trade between regions i and j when the relative price (P i / P j ) fluctuates outside the
. This band is increasing in d ij , thus a testable implication of this model is that the variance of Q ij is increasing in inter-regional distance when internal markets within a country are integrated.
Our goal is to measure temporal movements in inter-regional price dispersion. This goal is pursued using a regional data set comprised of two commodity price indexes: an index that measures the cost of a uniform basket of basic food goods; and a regional consumer price index (CPI). The foodbasket data span the period April 1994 through November 1999; the regional CPI data span the period January 1994 through November 1999: both were compiled by the Russian statistical agency Goskomstat. The data set includes observations from 74 Russian cities: Moscow, St. Petersburg, and capital cities in 72 additional regions.
1 The data are monthly; the food-basket data cover all 68 months during April 1994 through November 1999; the regional CPI data cover all 71 months during January 1994 through November 1999 . During 1994 , the food basket includes 19 food goods; starting in January of 1997, the basket was augmented with 6 additional food goods (see Goskomstat Rosiyi 1995 -2000 , various issues). The regional CPI includes a basket of food goods, non-food goods, and services.
Let t = 1, 2, …, M denote a particular month and year in which a commodity price index is computed, and let σ ij (s) denote the standard deviation of Q ij (t) calculated over the twelve-month subperiod indexed by s. To measure temporal movements in price dispersion, we calculate σ ij (s) for every possible (i,j) combination such that i ≠ j, and for every possible twelve-month sub-period in the time To measure market integration for region i in sub-period s, we use OLS to estimate
where α ij (s) is the estimated intercept, β i (s) is the coefficient for log distance from region i to all other regions, and u ij (s) is an error term. As noted previously, inter-regional price volatility in integrated economies should be increasing in log distance, thus we deem region i to be integrated during sub-period s when β i (s) is estimated as positive and statistically significant. 4 We define significance at the 10-percent level in the results reported below; the temporal patterns identified in this manner are robust to alternative choices. Standard errors used to evaluate significance throughout the paper are heteroscedasticity consistent (White, 1980) . 5 Table 2 summarizes for each region our measure of integration obtained using the June-1994, June-1995, …, June-1998 and May-1999 sub-intervals for the CPI data (the food-price data yield similar results; specific comparisons between the integration measures generated by the two price indexes are noted below). The presence of a 1, e.g., for the Arkhangelsk Oblast in June-1994 indicates that the estimate of β i (s) obtained for this region in this sub-period is positive and statistically significant; the presence of a 0 for this region in sub-period June-1996 indicates the opposite result for β i (s) in this subperiod. The average number of regions deemed to be integrated in each sub-period is reported in the bottom row of Table 2 ; Figure 1 plots these averages for each sub-period. In 1994, 50 percent of the regions in our sample were deemed to be integrated; integration then dropped to a striking 16.2 percent during the 1995 and 1996 sub-periods; and then systematically and dramatically recovered, reaching 79.7 percent in the 1999 sub-period.
6 Table 3 provides a more comprehensive picture by reporting integration percentages obtained using each of the 60 sub-periods available in our sample for the CPI data, and the 57 sub-periods available in our sample for the food-price data. These percentages are plotted in Figure 2 . The correlation between the two measures is 0.68, but the integration percentage is always higher when based on the food-price data. A possible explanation for this is that the CPI index contains a non-tradable goods and services component.
The more comprehensive picture of integration we obtain is once again roughly "U-shaped": an initially high level of integration existed up until June of 1995; it then fell markedly and remained relatively low until approximately June of 1997; and has climbed fairly steadily through the remainder of the sample period. Interestingly, the financial crisis in August 1998 had no noticeable impact on integration dynamics. We now turn to an analysis of the correspondence of our measures of integration with aggregate economic activity.
Market Integration and the Aggregate Economy 7
Our interest here is in analyzing how the temporal fluctuations in regional market integration characterized above correspond with related economic and political variables. In Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) we showed that voting patterns in the June 1996 presidential elections were important in explaining regional isolation observed between 1994 and 1996. Specifically, we classified Russian regions into two categories: those that supported the Communist Party candidate Zyuganov in the final round of elections (termed Red-Belt regions); and those that supported Yeltsin. Zyuganov's platform included an emphasis on price controls, price subsidies, and administered resource allocation. In contrast, Yeltsin's platform called for further price liberalization, a cutback in price subsidies, and a deepening of the privatization process. We found that this difference in platforms was an important predictor for differences in policies between the Red Belt and the rest of Russia. Specifically, we observed significantly more retail price regulation, budgetary and agricultural-price subsidization, and less entrepreneurial activity (measured by the number of legally registered small private firms per capita)
in the Red Belt during 1995-1996. As a possible explanation of this pattern, regional governments that 6 The methodology used by Glushchenko (2000) to measure integration involves examining the dispersion of the cross-regional distribution of Q ij (t) at various points in time. He finds that this dispersion follows a pattern similar to that illustrated in Figure 1 . 7 The analysis in this section is based on the integration measures obtained using the CPI data; similar results are obtained using the food-price data.
-7 -use subsidies and price controls to keep basic consumer goods cheap have an incentive to erect borders to limit the outflow of their cheap goods via exporting or non-residential consumption. And the presence of price restrictions and border controls is likely to result in an economic environment that is not conducive to entrepreneurial activity.
To expand on the findings of Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) , we begin our analysis here by studying whether regional reformist voting patterns correspond with the evolving pattern of integration reported above. To do this, we focus on the integration measures computed for the six median-year subperiods (illustrated in Figure 1 ). We compare these measures with three sets of observations on regional In the June 1994 sub-period, 57 percent of the pro-reformist-voting regions were integrated according to our measure, while 43 percent of the non-reformist regions were integrated; this difference is found to be statistically significant at the 10-percent level using a one-sided t test. In the June 1995 sub-period, the integration percentages are 24 and 8 percent, a difference significant at the 5-percent level. These sub-periods overlap with the time period covered in our previous analysis (Berkowitz and DeJong, 1999) , and the significant differences in integration percentages we find for these sub-periods here are consistent with our previous results. We also find a significant difference in integration percentages for the June 1998 sub-period (66 versus 46 percent). However, this is not the case for the Next, we analyze the interaction of our measure of market integration with four classes of aggregate economic variables: internal transport costs, international trade, public discontent, and standards of living. All variables are measured on a monthly basis.
Regarding internal transport costs, these directly impinge on the ability of arbitrageurs to profit from regional price differences, and thus weaken regional price linkages. We measure internal transport costs using a real freight-transport cost index. This was converted to a real index using aggregate CPI data (source: SITE, 1999).
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Regarding international trade, Young (1999) has argued that high trade shares may signal weak internal trade relationships. As noted previously, Russia's internal market was highly disconnected during the latter half of 1995 through 1997, a period in which Russia exported heavily on world markets.
To quantify trade activity, we use aggregate trade shares: imports plus exports divided by GDP (source:
SITE, 1999).
Regarding public discontent, there is evidence that regions dissatisfied with federal economic policies or with their political status within the federation have taken measures to isolate themselves from the internal market, including actions designed to limit trade flows across their borders (Mitchneck, 1995) . We consider two measures of public discontent: lost workdays due to strike activity, and over-due wage payments (or wage arrears), measured in real terms (source: SITE, 1999). Beyond fuelling public discontent, another reason wage arrears may coincide with breakdowns in integration is that they depress liquidity, which in turn raises the importance of barter trade, and increases the difficulty of conducting inter-regional trade. Figures 3a-c present time-series plots of internal transport costs, trade, real income and public discontent. In studying the relationship between these variables, timing is an issue: our measure of market integration at any given point in time is based on a twelve-month span of price behavior, thus linking our measure with a specific date is not straightforward. As noted, the dates we assign in reporting our measure of integration in Figure 1 and Table 2 correspond to the median month in the relevant twelve-month span. Thus, we report all variables as one-year moving averages that cover the same time period as the internal market integration measure. Figure 3a shows that real freight-transport costs initially exhibited mild fluctuations, and then began to decline continuously in January of 1996. Figure 3b illustrates that trade shares exhibit an "inverted-U dynamic" that runs roughly counter to the "U-shaped dynamic" exhibited by integration (see income and integration (the raw coefficient is -0.424) is suggestive that there are situations under which increases in regional income can destabilize a fiscal federation (Berkowitz, 1997) . Finally, the public discontent measures (strikes and wage arrears) illustrated in Figure 3c are highly correlated, with a raw coefficient of 0.798. Both measures exhibit a rough "inverted-U dynamic": strike activity peaks at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997, while real wage arrears are most explosive in summer and fall of 1998. The correlation between market integration and strike activity is negative (-0.303), while the correlation between integration and real wage arrears is nearly zero.
We characterize conditional correlations observed among our variables using the regression model log(integration t ) = γ 0 + γ 1 log(trade share t ) + γ 2 log(internal transport costs t ) + (2) γ 3 log(wage arrears t ) + γ 4 log(strikes t ) + γ 5 log(real income t ) + u t .
Because we use a rolling measure of market integration, OLS estimates of (2) generate residuals that are serially correlated. The pattern of serial correlation does not follow a simple AR(1) process, but can be eliminated by including two lags of log(integration) as explanatory variables:
log(integration t ) = γ 0 + γ 1 log(trade share t ) + γ 2 log(internal transport costs t ) + (3) γ 3 log(wage arrears t ) + γ 4 log(strikes t ) + γ 5 log(real income t ) + γ 6 log(integration t-1 ) + γ 7 log(integration t-2 ) + u t .
OLS estimates of equation (3) are reported in Table 4 .
Since all variables are measured in logs, their corresponding parameters represent elasticities.
Each parameter is statistically significant at the 10-percent level, and is quantitatively significant as well.
Real income and trade shares turn out to have the highest quantitative significance, with estimated elasticities of approximately 1.2 in absolute value. Despite the negative unconditional correlation exhibited between real income and integration, the conditional relationship estimated in (3) In sum, viewed from an aggregate perspective, there does seem to be a systematic statistical relationship between temporal fluctuations in market integration and economic activity in Russia.
Alternatively, the relationship between regional patterns of integration and political attitudes towards reform is more tenuous. Augmenting our regional voting data with regional measures of economic activity may yield a clearer picture of regional determinants of integration; this will be the subject of future research.
Conclusions
We have employed regional time-series data on commodity prices to quantify temporal fluctuations in the extent of regional-market integration in Russia. Using data observed across 74
Russian regions from 1994 through 1999, we found substantial time variation in integration: a widespread pattern of integration observed between 1994 and 1995 subsequently gave way to a period of disconnectedness in 1996 and 1997; this in turn was displaced by a resurgence in integration that has persisted through 1999.
-11 -This temporal pattern of integration exhibits clear correspondence with various aggregate measures of economic activity. This finding suggests that an analysis focused at the regional level may yield additional insights into causes of internal integration in Russia. Note: For the food-basket measure, the first available sub-period is that with the November 1994 median date. O c t -9 4 F e b -9 5 J u n -9 5 O c t -9 5 F e b -9 6 J u n -9 6 O c t -9 6 F e b -9 7 J u n -9 7 O c t -9 7 F e b -9 8 J u n -9 8 O c t -9 8 F e b -9 9
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Figure 3b: Trade and Real Income

Figure 3c: Public Discontent
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